CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND DIVIDEND POLICY OF QUOTED FIRMS IN NIGERIA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v2i3.018Keywords:
Corporate governance mechanisms, dividend policy, e-views, Nigeria, quoted firmsAbstract
This study considered time series data for 10-12 quoted listed consumer goods companies in Nigeria over 11-year period (2015-2025) to understand how corporate governance mechanisms affected dividend policy. Consumer goods companies was selected because it comprises companies that produce and distribute essential household products that enjoy relatively stable demand and consistent cash flows. Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects estimators are used in panel data regression analysis. The Hausman (1978) test is then used to choose the appropriate estimator. While residual diagnostic analysis identified the existence of non-normality and cross-sectional dependence and showed that this entire model was appropriately estimated using White cross-section robust standard errors, the Hausman test verified the preference for the Fixed Effects model.The relationships between board size, board independence, institutional ownership, and dividend payout were not statistically significant with this correct specification; however, the relationship between leverage and dividend payout stayed negative and significant for all three estimators, and the firm size maintained a robust negative relationship even after firm-specific heterogeneity was considered. This shows that, contrary to what classical agency theory predicted, the Nigerian consumer goods sector runs with an agency governance structure that is not the first line of discipline to manager discretion regarding dividend policy. Third, the study affirmed that dividend policy is more determined by the firm's characteristics and degree of leverage than by the structure of the board of directors. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria are encouraged to focus on firm-level heterogeneity and the governance of leverage in the codes.
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