CONSTITUENCY PROJECTS AND CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA’S BUDGETARY PROCESS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v2i3.039Keywords:
Constituency projects, zonal intervention projects, corruption, budgetary process, public procurement, budget transparencyAbstract
This article examines the governance and corruption risks associated with constituency projects within Nigeria’s federal budgetary process. Constituency projects, also referred to as zonal intervention projects, were introduced to direct public investment towards locally identified development needs. The study does not treat the existence of a failed, delayed or poorly executed project as proof of corruption. Instead, it uses a documentary analytical framework that distinguishes allegations, documented implementation irregularities and institutional weaknesses. Corruption-related indicators examined include documented diversion or misapplication of public funds, procurement irregularities, unexplained discrepancies between approved specifications and delivered outputs, conflicts of interest, non-execution where documentary evidence establishes an accountability concern, and other formally recorded infractions. The study uses qualitative documentary analysis of peer-reviewed literature, official budget and procurement materials, anti-corruption agency tracking reports and credible civil-society evidence covering 1999-2025. Particular attention is given to recent evidence from the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), including its constituency and executive projects tracking exercises. The evidence shows that constituency projects can generate developmental benefits, but accountability risks arise where project selection, procurement, supervision, disclosure and verification are weak. The evidence also indicates that several problems attributed to constituency projects have alternative explanations, including delayed fund releases, procurement and contracting weaknesses, inadequate supervision and institutional capacity constraints. The study therefore finds no basis for treating constituency projects as uniquely or inherently corrupt. Rather, their vulnerability is better understood as a function of the interaction between political incentives, information asymmetry and the quality of formal accountability institutions. The article contributes by developing an evidence-classification framework for analysing constituency-project corruption and by comparing constituency-project risks with broader public-project governance problems.
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