DOES FIRM SIZE CONDITION THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRATED REPORTING QUALITY? EVIDENCE FROM NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v2i3.047Keywords:
Board independence, firm size, integrated reporting quality, panel-corrected standard errorsAbstract
Boards in emerging markets are often expected to improve corporate reporting by adding independent directors, but the evidence on whether they do is mixed. This study asks whether board independence is associated with integrated reporting quality (IRQ) in Nigerian listed financial services firms, and whether firm size changes that association. Agency theory frames the question. The sample is a balanced panel of 34 of the 43 listed firms in the sector, observed from 2014 to 2024, which gives 374 firm-years. IRQ is an index built from the eight content elements and six capitals of the International Integrated Reporting Framework: each of 14 components is scored from 0 to 3 and the total is divided by 42. The model is a pooled regression with panel-corrected standard errors. Board independence and firm size are centred at their sample means before the interaction is formed. At average firm size, board independence is positively associated with IRQ (B = 0.226, p< .001). Firm size is also positively associated with IRQ at average board independence (B = 0.014, p< .001). The interaction between them is negative and not significant (B = −0.011, p = .115), so the data do not show that size moderates the link. Return on assets is not significant at the 5% level. These are associations from a pooled model without firm or year effects, and they are not causal estimates. Boards and regulators who rely on independence rules should also look at how complete, firm-specific and connected a report is.
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