MORAL HAZARD AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS: STUDY OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS IN NIGERIA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v1i3.12Keywords:
Government guarantees, moral hazard, Nigeria, regulation, systemically important banksAbstract
This study explores the phenomenon of moral hazard in the Nigerian banking sector, focusing on five (5) designated systemically important banks (SIBs). The study examines how implicit government guarantees, weak regulatory oversight, and limited competition have incentivised moral hazard in SIBs from 2013 to 2021. Using an exploratory research method, the study gathered empirical data and employed content analysis to assess the potential consequences of moral hazard in the Nigerian banking sector. The study found that moral hazardleads to financial instability, inefficient credit allocation, and diminished public trust. The study recommends that CBN should move away from the ‘comply or explain’ principle to proactively strengthen its regulatory oversight to prevent banks from engaging in reckless lending behaviour, AMCON should be scrapped to stop the bailout function it carries out, which serves as a source of moral hazard and CBN to enforce banks to comply with provisions of corporate governance codes for prudent lending decisions to align with the best interests of shareholders and stakeholders. Additionally, erring CEOs found guilty of reckless behaviour be arraigned and prosecuted.
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