VAT ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONCEPT OF FISCAL FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v2i1.10Keywords:
Federal government, fiscal federalism, states, subnational governments, vat administrationAbstract
Most Nigerian States’ internally generated revenue (IGR) cannot cover their operational costs without federal allocations. The administration of Value-Added Tax (VAT), a consumption tax, is vested in the Federal Government. This paper, therefore, examined how the over-concentration of taxing powers in the federal government affects States’ ability to expand their tax base. The research design adopted for the study was an Ex Post Facto Design. The data generated for the study is secondary, and regression and inferential techniques were employed for the analysis. The study is guided by the theories of Tax Assignment and Fiscal Federalism. The theory of Tax Assignment assumes that functions should be distributed between the central government and subnational governments, while the theory of fiscal federalism assumes that powers and responsibilities are shared among the tiers of government. The study revealed that VAT revenue generation has a significant effect on States debts; however, VAT allocation does not have a significant effect on States debts; VAT revenue generation has a significant effect on States IGR; and VAT allocation has a significant effect on States IGR. This implies that improvingthe tax base of the States will be hindered. To enable States to explore other alternative means of improving their revenue generation, it is recommended that true fiscal federalism should be encouraged and given the powers to collect VAT, which is a consumption tax, to the States.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Author(s)

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Google Scholar
CORE
BASE (Bielefeld Academic Search Engine)