WHEN DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE WORK? REVISITING GOVERNANCE AND STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION EFFECTIVENESS IN NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING FIRMS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57233/ijamer.v2i3.043Keywords:
corporate governance, strategic implementation, institutional theory, board effectiveness, manufacturing firms, NigeriaAbstract
This study examines why corporate governance mechanisms show inconsistent effects on strategic outcomes across the literature, testing five hypotheses linking board composition, ownership structure, CEO duality, board committees, and governance-related challenges to strategic implementation effectiveness in Nigerian manufacturing firms. Primary survey data were collected from 138 senior and middle managers across five Nigerian Stock Exchange-listed firms (Dangote, Unilever Nigeria, Nestle Nigeria, PZ Cussons, and Nigerian Breweries), analysed using multiple regression and principal component analysis. Governance items with routine operational content, board financial and risk expertise, long-term ownership orientation, and committee-level strategy review and internal control monitoring, significantly predict implementation effectiveness, while items more closely associated with formal compliance, independent-director counts, nominal CEO-chairman separation, and general audit committee independence, do not. A principal component analysis of ten governance-challenge items extracted a single Governance-Challenges component explaining 68.4 percent of shared item variance among those items; this component, entered separately as a predictor of implementation effectiveness, explained a further, distinct 60.8 percent of variance in that outcome (R squared = .608, p < .001), the strongest single effect in the study, though as a ten-item composite it is not directly comparable to the individual governance coefficients reported elsewhere. This pattern is interpreted, cautiously, through the lens of institutional theory's account of decoupling, alongside agency, stewardship, resource dependence, and contingency perspectives, while acknowledging that decoupling itself is inferred from patterns of statistical significance rather than directly observed in board practice. The study contributes an empirically grounded, multi-theoretic account of governance effectiveness in an emerging-market manufacturing context and offers cautious guidance for boards and regulators, while identifying common method variance, sample scope, and construct-level limitations that bound the strength of its claims.
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